Nigerian government and Boko Haram strike secret ceasefire deal

Boko Haram is headed by Ibrahim Bakura Doro, the overall commander and imam (religious leader), based on the islands on the northern section of Lake Chad, on the Niger Republic border.

Boko Haram has three factions, all of which have sworn allegiance to Bakura: Darul Gazwa, operating in southeastern Borno and headed by Alhaii Kale; the Sadiku group of Abubakar Sadiku Saidu, active around north-central Nigeria; and the Ali Ngulde faction, which carried out the Ngoshe kidnappings.

The success of the ceasefire depends on whether Bakura, from his Lake Chad base thousands of kilometres away, can yoke the three other Boko Haram commanders into a sustainable deal.

Rival ISWAP is operationally and organisationally distinct from Boko Haram, its jihadist cousin. While Boko Haram survives on looting and extorting civilians – a practice known as ghanima – plundering is banned by ISWAP.

Boko Haram is also more locally focused whereas ISWAP – among the most active of so-called Islamic State-Central’s franchises – is loyal to the transnational “caliphate”, which effectively hands IS-Central veto power over any dialogue initiative, according to people familiar with the group.

“ISWAP needs buy-in from IS. They make the final decision,” a rehabilitated former ISWAP commander told The New Humanitarian. “But Bakura needs money, you can make a deal with him.”

Boko Haram began as an ultra-conservative religious movement in the early 2000s in Maiduguri under a young cleric, Mohammed Yusuf. It tapped into a radical zeitgeist that appealed across classes – condemning so-called “Western values” and celebrating 500 years of Islamic learning and empire in Nigeria’s northeast.

Initially, Yusuf resisted calling for jihad, but as tensions with the authorities increased, he launched an urban insurrection in July 2009. It was quickly crushed, and Yusuf was extrajudicially killed by the police.

Money is not just an inducement but also a practical requirement. “Any arrangement involves a payment, otherwise how would they eat as there would be no ghanima?” explained the Abuja-based security official.

Buying off opponents has also been the traditional approach of the Nigerian political establishment, from ending the insurgency in the oil-rich Delta in 2009, to ongoing attempts to try and contain bandit violence in the northwest.

However, such a transactional arrangement can be a negative incentive, creating a demand for more. “If you give them money, that doesn’t guarantee peace,” cautioned a former Boko Haram hostage negotiator.

“Do a deal with one, to fight the other”

Yet the scenario the security establishment would most welcome – and see as tantalisingly plausible – is if dialogue could then lead to an alliance with Bakura against ISWAP: “To do a deal with one, to fight the other.”

ISWAP is the most lethal of the jihadi insurgents. It is centralised, bureaucratic, and well-funded, with a tax base that far outstrips the revenue Borno State earns.

It has also proven tactically adaptable, technologically advanced, and its combat successes have attracted experienced fighters and instructors from across the Sahel and North African Maghreb.

The failure of the Nigerian navy to undertake a meaningful lake-based offensive – which would involve navigating through a complex and changing ecology of swamps, channels, and islands – means ISWAP’s bases are relatively safe.

“They are only nervous about the [air force] bombing, but every house has a shelter,” said Abu Jabir, a farmer who lives in ISWAP-controlled territory but comes to Maiduguri to buy fishing gear.

Bakura, however, is seen as a persistent danger to ISWAP. “Bakura people are always attacking: They are powerful, they know how to fight on the water,” he explained.

Bakura holds a particular animosity towards ISWAP. When Boko Haram split in 2016 (see timeline), he remained loyal to the group’s then leader and imam, Abubaker Shekau, who rewarded him with significant autonomy.

But in 2021, ISWAP managed to overrun Shekau’s Sambisa Forest base in southern Borno, and Shekau detonated a suicide vest.

“For Bakura, it’s personal,” said Samuel. “Former Bakura fighters have told me that he prefers to attack ISWAP rather than the military. Even if he attacks military bases, it’s to get weapons to attack ISWAP.”

By Obi Anyadike. A version of this report was first published by The New Humanitarian.