Following the Christmas Day airstrikes by the US, terrorist groups in northern Nigeria are becoming more defiant and are embracing new technology, writes Ezenwa Olumba. Counter-terrorism strategy will need to adapt to this new reality.
On Christmas Day 2025, US President Donald Trump ordered air and drone strikes against insurgent groups in Sokoto State in north-west Nigeria. Trump described the attacks as an “amazing Christmas present” to members of the Lakurawa, a militant group operating within some communities along the Nigeria–Niger border. He also pledged further such air strikes if what he framed as “Christian genocide” does not stop in Nigeria.
Despite what Trump says, the violent conflicts in Nigeria are about more than just religion. And the air and drone strikes don’t appear to have deterred the terrorists in the region.
Rather than easing insecurity in Sokoto, the aftermath of the strikes suggests armed groups have become more defiant and have escalated threats and attacks.
Fighting drones with drones
Reports indicate that Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has acquired around 35 commercial drones. This development signals a shift from ground-based operations towards the deployment of airborne attack drones.
Until recently, insurgent and terrorist groups in Nigeria had not used armed drones. But rising revenues and increased technical capacity will allow them to carry out drone-based attacks in the future. Groups including ISWAP and Boko Haram have progressed from using drones for intelligence and surveillance to deploying them alongside fighters during assaults on Nigerian military barracks, many of which have resulted in heavy losses for government forces.
The drones ISWAP is reported to have acquired are likely to be off-the-shelf first person-view (FPV) models. These can be adapted to carry small explosives and used in attacks. An FPV drone is a low-cost quadcopter operated with goggles and a handheld controller that can carry light explosives and be guided to a target to detonate on impact. Most small FPV drones can carry about 1.5 kg of explosives and travel at about 37 mph. The effectiveness of FPV drones can be seen by how they have altered battlefield tactics in Ukraine.
If ISWAP and other terrorist groups can obtain drones at scale, it suggests that insecurity in Nigeria, particularly in the north-east and north-west, may be entering a more dangerous phase.
A greater reliance on attack drones by these terrorists could change the tempo of violence. Drones can enable them to conduct repeated, sustained strikes against the Nigerian military formations rather than sporadic raids. It also raises the prospect of coordinated multi-drone attacks by the terrorists using drone swarms.
Ukraine has shown how access to cheap FPV drones can narrow the advantage held by better-equipped state forces. The FPV is changing modern warfare. A similar pattern could emerge in Nigeria unless the armed forces adapt quickly to the spread of drone-enabled insurgency. Without rapid investment in counter-drone capabilities and stronger intelligence, Nigeria risks losing operational advantage in its counter-insurgency campaign.
Following the Turkish lead
African states should adopt a ‘Turkish model’ for countering drone threats from non-state armed groups. The idea is to reduce reliance on imported, pre-made drone technologies and invest in state-backed research, development, and local production across the drone supply chain, as well as autonomous systems.
Turkey pursued this approach in the past, helping it to build a domestic drone industry associated with Selçuk Bayraktar and Baykar technologies. Baykar’s TB2 drones were widely associated with Ukraine’s early defensive efforts after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
The next phase of counterinsurgency will be shaped less by sheer firepower than by speed of adaptation towards emerging technologies. Nigeria and other African countries need to have the capacity to develop and field multiple drone systems, strengthen air defence, and build effective counter-drone defences across the areas most at risk.
Nigeria and other African states have a growing number of start-ups developing drone and autonomous systems. Some examples of Nigerian tech start-ups include Briech UAS and Terra Industries. Terra Industries has reportedly raised £8.6 million through an entity linked to Palantir Technologies. Funding rounds like this show investor interest, but national security cannot rest mainly on foreign capital.
These firms should be supported through targeted state funding, as Turkey did with Baykar Technologies. Stable state-funded support would allow companies to spend less time chasing finance and more time on research, testing, and production.
If Nigeria treats drone and autonomous weapons systems as a strategic national security priority, it should invest directly in several local firms as part of a wider defence-industrial policy. Protecting lives and property is a core duty of the state. External support can help, but without a capable and up-to-date military that is equipped to detect, disrupt, and defeat hostile drone use, operations against terrorist groups will continue to fall short.
The response of the Nigerian military to the emerging drone-enabled insurgency will determine how insecurity will deteriorate in the country. Backing credible start-ups is not a substitute for wider reform, but it can strengthen the supply of systems, parts, training, and maintenance needed for a sustained response to the emerging drone-enabled insurgency.
This piece was first published in The Conversation.
